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1. Introduction
.................................................................................................................................................
A fundamental principle in Cognitive Linguistics is that semantics is, indeed, pri-
marily cognitive and not a matter of relationships between language and the world
(or truth conditions with respect to a model). This principle becomes especially
manifest in the research into facets of meaning and grammatical organization
which crucially makes use of notions such as ‘‘perspective,’’ ‘‘subjectivity,’’ or
‘‘point of view.’’ What these notions have in common is that they capture aspects
of conceptualization that cannot be sufficiently analyzed in terms of properties of
the object of conceptualization, but, in one way or another, necessarily involve a
subject of conceptualization. A strong incentive for this type of research stems
from the awareness that the more linguistic problems can be solved by making
use of these notions, the more (heuristically) successful the fundamental princi-
ple is; in addition, this research is motivated by the awareness that the best way
to make these notions relevant for linguistic analysis is not given a priori and
thus requires empirical investigation. It is therefore not surprising that there is in
fact quite a large body of research into such nonobjective facets of linguistic
meaning.
The cover term that has come to be used for different ways of viewing a par-
ticular situation is ‘‘construal.’’ At a very elementary level, construal is a feature of
the meaning of all linguistic expressions, if only as a consequence of the fact
that languages provide various ways for categorizing situations, their participants1____
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and features, and the relations between them. Speaking thus always implies a
choice:
A speaker who accurately observes the spatial distribution of certain stars can
describe them in many distinct fashions: as a constellation, as a cluster of stars, as
specks of light in the sky, etc. Such expressions are semantically distinct; they re-
flect the speaker’s alternate construals of the scene, each compatible with its
objectively given properties. (Langacker 1990a: 61)
The fact that a particular situation can be construed in alternate ways should, from
a cognitive linguistic perspective, not come as a big surprise or require extensive
justification. What is more important linguistically is that languages systematically
provide means for different kinds of construal. For instance, the distinct descrip-
tions of a single phenomenon given in the quotation from Langacker above differ
in (among other things) the frames of knowledge with respect to which the con-
ceived situation is characterized: a particular distribution of stars is only consid-
ered a constellation in a culturally shared traditional frame of knowledge about
the structure of the sky, while this framework is not required for conceptualiz-
ing it as a cluster. So one type of construal involved in these examples crucially
involves frames of knowledge (or ‘‘Idealized Cognitive Models’’). Another type,
also involved here, focuses on the compositionality of the conceptualization: both
a cluster of stars and specks of light in the sky evoke their objects of conceptuali-
zation by combining several elements into a whole in some particular way, while
the lexical item constellation does not. Then again, specks of light in the sky (with
the plural noun specks as its head) focuses on the multiplicity of the phenome-
non observed, whereas constellation and a cluster of stars impose the construal of a
coherent unit (with the cluster constituting a ‘‘multiplex’’ one in the sense of Talmy
2000a: 59).
This simple example already shows that there are several dimensions along
which construals may vary. Cognitive linguists, most notably Langacker and Talmy,
have proposed a number of classification schemes for construal phenomena, in at-
tempts to organize them into a relatively small number of basic types. However,
these classificatory systems seem to exhibit a substantial amount of arbitrariness.
This is partly due to the fact that research into construal phenomena, while ubiq-
uitous in ordinary language and therefore highly important, has at the same time led
to a large increase in the number of known distinct construal operations. Therefore,
it is useful to consider a few more types of construal before considering the clas-
sification proposals. It should be evident, though, that this cannot be a compre-
hensive list of construal phenomena.
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2. The Diversity of Construal
Phenomena
.................................................................................................................................................
One of the first construal operations to have been recognized as linguistically highly
relevant is the ‘‘Figure/Ground’’ distinction, well known from studies in Gestalt
psychology. It was introduced into Cognitive Linguistics (even before it was known
under that name) through the work of Talmy (1978). In visual perception, one
element may be the focus of attention—the ‘‘Figure’’; it is perceived as a prominent
coherent element and set off against the rest of what is in the field of vision—the
‘‘Ground.’’ This psychological distinction is reflected in many linguistic distinc-
tions, lexical as well as grammatical. Consider, for instance, the expressions X is
above Y and Y is below X; while these expressions denote the same spatial config-
uration, they are semantically distinct in that they reflect different selections of the
participant that is to provide the Ground, with respect to which the other partic-
ipant, as Figure can be located. A well-known example of a grammatical alternation
in which the construal of a participant as either Figure or Ground constitutes part
of the semantic difference is the active/passive contrast.
The meanings of lexical items quite generally include a subtype of this Figure/
Ground construal. Consider the meaning of the word uncle, which presupposes a
background network of kinship relations, and foregrounds one particular node in
it. More generally, a lexical item usually designates, or ‘‘profiles’’ (in Langacker’s
terminology), a substructure within a larger structure (the ‘‘base’’), and knowing
what larger structure is involved is part of knowing the meaning of that item. The
words finger and thumb, while profiling different substructures, share the con-
ception of a hand as their base; the same holds for ceiling and floor with respect to a
room, and so on. A general linguistic reflex of this phenomenon is found in con-
straints on expressions denoting part-whole relationships; these may not ‘‘bypass’’
base-profile relations. While The hand of this animal has three fingers is felicitous,
?The arm of this animal has three fingers is definitely awkward, and This animal has
three fingers has an entirely different meaning.
Profile-base distinctions also exist in the domain of time. The flow of time
constitutes (part of) the base of the meaning of verbs. Different lexical verbs may
profile different ‘‘slices’’ of time, backgrounding and foregrounding different features
(thus producing different ‘‘aspectual’’ profiles). For example, think and read present
processes that are construed as ongoing, not involving a change in the period of time
being focused on, while arrive and promise present processes that crucially involve
a change at the time being focused on. Grammatical constructions may impose a
particular kind of profile on the temporal interpretation of a situation. For example,
the English progressive construction (beþV-ing) can be said to impose a particular
profile on the interpretation of the clause, backgrounding any boundaries (beginning
and end point) of the designated process, irrespective of the meaning of the verb (see
also Michaelis 2004; Boogaart and Janssen, this volume, chapter 31).
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Another important construal operation is based on the fact that objects and
situations can be perceived at different levels of ‘‘resolution,’’ or ‘‘granularity.’’ One
linguistic correlate of this cognitive feature is the fact that lexical categories may form
taxonomic hierarchies consisting of various levels of specificity (e.g., Palomino, horse,
mammal, animal, living thing, thing). Each of these levels corresponds to our per-
ception of things at different degrees of granularity. This in itself already allows
language users to describe events at different levels of specificity (or, conversely,
schematicity). Some of the most common verbs in a language are highly schematic
(e.g., English be, have, do, and make), allowing a speaker to characterize a situation
without paying attention to all the details of the specific state or process involved.
Thus, the same objective situation can be described as The young physicist wrote an
original book, The physicist wrote a book, The scientist produced a publication, The
woman made something, or She made something. Often, the role of verbs in a con-
struction is to provide specifics to the schematic conceptualization evoked by the
construction. For example, They made their way through the forest, although itself a
specific case of a transitive template, still evokes a rather schematic image of over-
coming resistance and movement, while They cut their way through the forest provides
more details about the means of ‘‘way-making.’’ The function of modifiers is to
allow for representations with a high degree of specificity on the basis of (clausal and
nominal) templates that are in themselves only rather schematic for types of events—
that is, modifiers also make specificity possible without the need for more templates.
An example of grammatical construal involving different levels of granularity
is provided by those causative constructions which code the causal and the result
components of an event separately (e.g., English to make something happen). Such a
construction construes an event with a higher degree of resolution than a causal
lexical verb would; compare, for instance, to make someone believe something with
to tell someone something. This, in turn, allows variation in explicit, highly granular
construals of causal relationships, with distinctions such as those between to make
someone believe something and to let someone believe something.
The construal phenomena discussed so far variously impose structure on con-
ceptualizations in ways that do not immediately follow from their content, which
is why they are considered cases of construal in the first place. Another form of
construal consists in understanding one conceptualization in relation to another
one. For example, tense marking in a finite clause in English relates the situation
mentioned in the clause to the conceptualization of the communicative situation
(roughly, as overlapping or not), which is why the category of tense is considered
‘‘deictic’’—along with such elements as personal pronouns (with I and you iden-
tifying participants in the conceived situation as communicative participants and
third-person pronouns identifying situation participants as not participating in the
communicative process) and adverbs like here, now, there, and then. Other ways of
understanding one conceptualization in relation to another are by establishing
similarity or any sufficiently salient contingent connection—these two constitute
the basis (albeit not exhaustively) for metaphor and metonymy, respectively—or by
establishing contrast (e.g., negation) or scalarity (e.g., comparison).
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Not only can construals of events be different within languages, but also across
languages; that is, there exist typological distinctions in terms of construal—an
issue related to the issue of linguistic relativity. For example, languages may not
only have different means available to organize spatial relations, they may also
differ radically in the way space is conceptually structured. In such cases, individual
speakers have little or no freedom of choice to pick one construal over another, as
their language simply lacks some of the ‘‘options.’’ Nevertheless, what is involved is
still different construals of similar experiences or phenomena.
One type that has traditionally received much attention is the different ways
motion events are expressed linguistically in languages such as English, on the one
hand, and languages such as Spanish, on the other (see Talmy 2000b: 21–67, for a
recent comprehensive overview). In English, the verb in a sentence expressing a
motion event usually also encodes (features of) a ‘‘co-event,’’ such as manner (to
slide, to roll, to bounce, etc.) or cause or instrument (to push, to blow, to chop, to
pound, etc.), while the direction of movement may be indicated by optional adjuncts
(into the water, etc.). In Spanish, on the other hand, the verb is mostly required
to mark some aspect of directionality, and factors such as manner or instrument
may be expressed by means of adjuncts ( . . . entro´ a la casa bailando ‘ . . . entered
the house dancing’). Spanish, encoding the path component of motion in the verb,
is called a ‘‘verb-framed language,’’ while English is called a ‘‘satellite-framed lan-
guage.’’ Since verbs are obligatory elements in clauses expressing events, the two
types of languages conventionally impose different construals on the conceptu-
alization of motion events. It is findings of this type that have given rise to a
research program, especially executed by Talmy, into the questions of what the
typological variation in construal among languages is and what kind of factors are
involved in it.
Another highly intriguing question triggered by this kind of typological results
concerns the influence of conventional construal patterns in a language on the
thought processes of its speakers (see Bowerman 1996; Levinson 2001). With respect
to the distinction between satellite-framed and verb-framed languages in the do-
main of motion events, Slobin has developed his concept of ‘‘thinking for speak-
ing’’; the idea is that the grammatical patterns of a native language force its learners
to habitually pay attention to those features of events that are necessary for ex-
pression in linguistic communication (Slobin 1996)—this issue is developed further
by Pederson in chapter 38 of the present Handbook.
In view of the multitude of possible construal operations and their diverse uses
across languages—which has become apparent even from this brief overview—a
number of interrelated questions can be raised. How are construal operations
related to each other? Are there basic types of construal? Which construal rela-
tions share which properties? Can linguistic expressions be exhaustively charac-
terized as belonging to certain types and not others? One additional consideration
that gives rise to these questions is the fact that certain phenomena systematically
seem to allow for more than one classification. For example, the fact that a phe-
nomenon allows for construal at different levels of specificity is at least to some
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extent related to the fact that it can be seen as similar to other phenomena: the
higher the schematicity, the more general the category to which it is assigned, and
thus the larger the set of phenomena that are considered similar. Or consider the
English progressive above, which was characterized in terms of profiling
(backgrounding of the boundaries of a process unfolding in time); an alternative
way of characterizing the progressive might be in terms of viewpoint: the position
from which the situation is viewed is contained in the ongoing process itself (so
that any boundaries are not ‘‘in view’’). Considerations like these also make the
question which types of construal operations there are, and how they are con-
nected, an urgent one. So let us now turn to the issue of classifying construal
phenomena.
3. Classifications of
Construal Operations
.................................................................................................................................................
Langacker (1987: 116–37) proposed the following threefold classification of con-
strual operations (then called ‘‘focal adjustments’’):
a. Selection
b. Perspective
c. Abstraction
The first category concerns language users’ capacity to selectively attend to some
facets of a conceptualization and ignoring others. The second comprises linguistic
manifestations of the position from which a situation is viewed, and is divided into
four subtypes: (i) Figure/Ground alignment, (ii) Viewpoint, (iii) Deixis, and (iv)
Subjectivity/Objectivity. The third major category relates to our ability to establish
commonalities between distinct phenomena and abstracting away from differences,
and thus to organize concepts into categories. Langacker has since revised his clas-
sification, which now1 looks as follows (see Langacker, this volume, chapter 17):
a. Specificity
b. Prominence
c. Perspective
d. Dynamicity
The first class (Specificity) roughly corresponds to the previous class Abstraction.
The new category of Prominence comprises especially Figure/Ground phenomena
and the phenomena formerly categorized under Selection. Perspective has remained
the same, except that of the subtype Figure/Ground has now been placed in the
Prominence category. Dynamicity is an additional category and concerns the
development of a conceptualization through processing time (rather than through
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conceived time). It is first of all connected to the inherent temporal nature of
linguistic utterances: presenting elements of a conceptualization in a different order
results in differences of meaning. But a dynamic, sequential conceptualization may
also result from the application of a dynamic concept to an object of conceptuali-
zation that is not inherently dynamic itself (as in The road winds through the valley).
Talmy (1988) originally proposed the following ‘‘imaging systems’’ as the major
classes of construal phenomena:
a. Schematization
b. Perspective
c. Attention
d. Force Dynamics
There is a considerable overlap between this proposal and the one by Langacker,
which in itself is indicative of the relevance of these classes. Thus, Talmy’s Sche-
matization largely corresponds to Langacker’s Specificity; both have a category
Perspective comprising similar phenomena, and Talmy’s category Attention over-
laps with Langacker’s Prominence. Force Dynamics, though, is absent from Lan-
gacker’s classification.
Talmy (2000a: 40–84) has now also revised his classification, yielding the fol-
lowing major categories:
a. Configurational Structure
b. Perspective
c. Distribution of Attention
d. Force Dynamics2
Perpendicular to these four ‘‘schematic systems,’’ as they are now called, there is
a ‘‘schematic category’’ called Domain, which includes only a very limited number
of major dimensions of construal, namely, ‘‘space’’ and ‘‘time.’’3 As such, a single
specific construal operation from the schematic system ‘‘configurational structure’’
(e.g., ± boundedness) may apply to several domains. For example, in the domain of
space as well as that of time, concepts may be construed as discrete (i.e., as objects
in space and acts in time) or as continuous (as masses in space and activities in
time). This way of cross-combining construal operations is linguistically justified
by the fact that in nominalization (which converts concepts from the domain of
time to the domain of space) acts are construed as objects and activities as mass,
witness such pairs as in (1) and (2):
(1) John called me – John gave me a call.
(2) John helped me – John gave me some help.
In Langacker’s approach, Talmy’s domains of ‘‘space’’ and ‘‘time’’ correspond to
the conceptual distinction between nouns and verbs. In particular, Langacker (1987,
2005) views nouns as ‘‘things,’’ understood as a construal resulting from conceptual
grouping and reification, and verbs as ‘‘processes,’’ understood as a construal re-
sulting from sequential scanning of a temporally manifested relationship. However,
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Langacker does not treat the noun-verb distinction as reflecting a fundamental
schematic category in itself, but rather as a special instance of Figure/Ground
organization (in particular, the profile-base organization) and of categorization.
The English noun and verb cook, for example, have a shared conceptual content, but
in one class of constructions (the cook, etc.), a different part of this content is
‘‘profiled’’ than in constructions (to cook, etc.) that encode a processual const-
rual(schematically presented in figure 3.1).
Because of these (and other) patterns, the English word cook can be regarded as
having a schematic sense that does not impose a particular profile and thus serves
as a superordinate category for the specific nominal and verbal uses of the word
(Langacker 2005). Figure 3.2 provides a schematic representation.
It is clear from the foregoing that, while the concepts employed in Langacker’s
and Talmy’s analyses play a rather different role in their respective frameworks,
their approaches basically capture the same insights. Furthermore, they both
embrace the idea that several dimensions of construal can be involved in the
meaning of a single linguistic expression. What these two points suggest is that any
classification of construal phenomena in a particular language is likely to be at least
to some extent arbitrary, if only because linguistic units often participate in more
than a single kind of construal.
Croft and Cruse (2004: 43–46) also indicate that a classification of construal
phenomena is to some extent arbitrary or cannot be entirely motivated. For one
thing, they observe that the classifications proposed by Langacker and Talmy share a
number of features, but also that it is not obvious how the differences can be rec-
onciled. Furthermore, they point out that from both classifications, some dimensions
of construal (e.g., image schemas) are still missing and their integration into the
proposed classifications is not immediately evident. Building on an earlier com-
parison of construal classifications (Croft and Wood 2000), Croft and Cruse (2004:
45) then state that the main categories in such a classification should correspond to
psychological processes and capacities that have been established independently, by
psychologists and phenomenologists. But this requirement had, of course, already
motivated Langacker’s and Talmy’s classifications. Thus, it is no surprise that the
classification proposed by Croft and Cruse overlaps with those by Langacker and
Figure 3.1. ‘‘Nominal’’ and ‘‘verbal’’ construal of the same content in different con-
structions
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Talmy. Aside from some (smaller) reassignments of specific kinds of construal to
other major categories, the main difference between Croft and Cruse’s classification
and those of Langacker and Talmy is that the former is more comprehensive than the
latter ones. The main categories, according to Croft and Cruse, are:
a. Attention/Salience
b. Judgment/Comparison
c. Perspective/Situatedness
d. Constitution/Gestalt
Category (a), Attention/Salience, in general comprises the same types of con-
struals as the ones subsumed under Talmy’s Attention category (and Langacker’s
Prominence), but it also contains as subcategories certain construal phenomena
that had the status of major categories in (some version of) Langacker’s and Tal-
my’s work; specifically, it includes Langacker’s Abstraction and Talmy’s Schema-
tization (‘‘scalar adjustments’’) and Langacker’s Dynamicity. In addition, it contains
the subcategory Scope (including referent accessibility; see Ariel 1990), a category
which was not explicitly discussed by Langacker or Talmy.
The second category, Judgment/Comparison, contains the subcategories Cat-
egorization, Metaphor, and Figure/Ground. As such, we can observe that Figure/
Ground has been reassigned from the category Attention/Prominence in Talmy’s
and Langacker’s work. Furthermore, Categorization is not viewed as a Schemati-
zation phenomenon, as Talmy had it—despite the intimate connection between the
two. Then again, the inclusion of Metaphor in the classification of construal phe-
nomena makes this classification more comprehensive than previous ones.
The Perspective category is the one that is obviously most similar to that in the
other proposals. The category Constitution/Gestalt, finally, overlaps with Talmy’s
(2000a) category Configurational Structure, but also includes Force Dynamics.
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of classifications? First of all,
although all classifications share the requirement that they should reflect general
and well-established psychological abilities, they still turn out to be considerably
different.
The proposal by Croft and Cruse, who formulate this requirement most em-
phatically, actually raises the same kind of questions as those that were raised by the
other proposals; the assignment of particular construal operations under one rubric
rather than another cannot always be clearly motivated (e.g., why, for instance,
Figure 3.2. The word stem cook categorizing nominal and verbal construal
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Fictive Motion should be subsumed under Attention/Salience and not under Con-
stitution/Gestalt?). The increase in coverage of construal operations in Croft and
Cruse’s classification in fact goes hand in hand with a further decrease of its trans-
parency. It looks as if any new construal operation being discovered requires its own
new category. Obviously, this does not mean that certain construal operations must
therefore be excluded from the theory, but rather that construal operations may vary
in so many different respects that attempts at an exhaustive classification necessarily
have a considerable degree of arbitrariness. In fact, in his contribution to the present
Handbook, Langacker states that his ‘‘classification of construal phenomena is . . .
mostly for expository convenience’’ (chapter 17, note 22).
An additional reason for taking up this position is the fact that these taxo-
nomies not only serve to classify the construal operations, but also the linguistic
elements that express them. Now, what has not been taken into account in any of
the classification schemes considered is the fact that the type of construal linguistic
expressions reflect may gradually change. But precisely this observation casts
considerable doubt on the feasibility of a psychologically realistic classification
scheme. We can illustrate this with the phenomenon, well known from gram-
maticalization studies, that markers of perfectivity may change into markers of past
tense. Such a change involves a transfer from the category of configurational
construal operations (imposing boundedness on the conceived event) to the cat-
egory of perspectival, deictic ones (marking the conceived event as preceding the
communicative event). However, the meaning of a linguistic unit does not shift
from one class of construal operations to another one overnight; semantic change
is gradual. The diachronic development implies that for many speakers of a lan-
guage for a long time (normally spanning several generations), these perfective
expressions reflect both types of construal, in the sense that both types remain
distinguishable for analysts. For the speakers themselves, however, it makes more
sense to assume that they operate with a complex but unitary (‘‘Gestalt-like’’)
construal operation in which the effect on the structure of the event (‘completed’)
is immediately associated with an effect on the relation of the event to the com-
municative situation (‘past’). In other words, it is part of these speakers’ knowledge
of the conventions of their language that the unit involved conveys this complex
construal. It is thus psychologically unrealistic to want to assign this particular
construal operation to one category rather than another. For the speakers, it simply
is a category in its own right, possibly sharing more or less prototypical charac-
teristics of several other types of construal, some ‘‘configurational,’’ some ‘‘per-
spectival.’’ In fact, such conclusions soon appear inevitable on the basis of research
into the details of the working of any particular kind of construal operation in
actual usage (see Cornelis 1997 on construals effected by passive constructions).
Thus, it is precisely from a cognitive point of view that one should not expect
that classifications of construal operations can be set up that are exhaustive and
complete. From this perspective, it is therefore quite appropriate that the chapters
to follow simply present the most important and well-studied types of construal
operations successively.
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The insight that a general classification scheme for construal operations is not
feasible should not obscure the fact that the set of these operations definitely ex-
hibits structure—it is not a list of totally unrelated notions. Some subsets of con-
strual operations share more features with each other than with other ones, and as
such the entire set of construal phenomena is amenable to a structure comprising
some general rubrics under which they can be subsumed on the basis of their
recurrent or shared features.
There is one such rubric that stands out as a more general dimension of
construal than other ones, namely, perspective. In view of the differences between
the different classification systems discussed above, it is striking that they show
agreement about the relevance of a class of perspectival construal operations.
Actually, this is hardly surprising since the concept of ‘‘construal’’ was introduced
to capture aspects of conceptualization that cannot be adequately analyzed in
terms of the object of conceptualization but require reference to a subject’s per-
ception, choice, or point of view. Accordingly, I will assume that perspective is a
central part of the entire range of possible construal relations, in fact a definitional
aspect of prototypical instances of construal.
We may think of the general rubrics under which construal operations can be
subsumed as establishing a kind of ‘‘conceptual space’’ for construal. A linguistic
element conventionally conveying a specific kind of construal may in principle
occupy any position in this space; elements sharing features can be thought of as
close together, forming ‘‘clusters’’ in this space without necessarily belonging in
preestablished, bounded regions. Starting from fundamental features of the notion
‘‘construal’’ itself, the remainder of this chapter will develop a general conceptual
framework in terms of which construal operations may be characterized, as an al-
ternative to different classification schemes discussed before. On the one hand, this
framework will not provide a new exhaustive classification (nor is it intended as
one); on the other hand, it will allow us to see that still more (especially gram-
matical) phenomena may crucially involve construal (especially perspectivization)
than have already been considered so far.
4. A General Framework
for Characterizing
Construal Operations
.................................................................................................................................................
Langacker (1987: 487–88) defines the construal relationship as follows: ‘‘The rela-
tionship between a speaker (or hearer) and a situation that he conceptualizes and
portrays, involving focal adjustments and imagery.’’ In this definition, the construal1____
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relation basically involves an individual (speaker or hearer), on the one hand, and a
conceived situation, on the other. Thus, it corresponds closely to Langacker’s
‘‘viewing arrangement’’ (cf. Langacker 1987: 129; 1993: 454). Diagrammatically, this
relationship can be represented as in figure 3.3.
This configuration, being two-dimensional, already embodies one very basic
distinction between construal types. As was pointed out in section 2, some con-
struals involve the imposition of structure on the object of conceptualization, while
others consist in one conceptualization being understood in relation to another one,
in particular the communicative situation. Different sorts of structure (attentional,
force-dynamic, etc.) involve the higher, horizontal level of figure 3.3, while different
sorts of relations to the communicative situation (deixis, viewpoint, etc.) concern
the vertical relation.4
Langacker subsequently identifies the lower, horizontal level of figure 3.3 as the
‘‘ground’’ (Langacker 1987: 126; 1990b: 9), which he defines as the ensemble of the
communicative event, its participants, and its immediate circumstances.5 Al-
though in this definition, the ground includes participants—in plural—rather than
a singular ‘‘viewer,’’ no distinction is made between different speech act partici-
pants, and the graphic representations given still represent only a single ‘‘viewer’’
(or ‘‘subject’’ of conceptualization).6 Moreover, while the configuration, as depicted
in figure 3.3, is amenable to providing a wide array of cognitive abilities with respect
to various objects of conceptualization, it does not accommodate one highly hu-
man capacity, namely, to take into account other minds in relation to an object of
conceptualization. Indeed, it is a characteristically human trait to be able to identify
deeply with conspecifics. In characterizing biologically determined cognitive dif-
ferences and similarities between young humans and other primates, Tomasello
(1999: 14–15) writes:
There is just one major difference, and that is the fact that human beings ‘iden-
tify’ with conspecifics more deeply than do other primates. This identification is
not something mysterious, but simply the process by which the human child
understands that other persons are beings like herself . . . and so she sometimes
tries to understand things from their point of view. . . . For purposes of exposition
Figure 3.3. A viewing arrangement
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I refer to this process generally as ‘understanding others as intentional (or mental)
agents (like the self).’7
Language use, which is dependent on mutually shared knowledge of conventions,
is crucially dependent on recognizing others like oneself. So, certainly with respect
to linguistically coded conceptualizations, Langacker’s initial way of construing
the construal relationship may be treated as a special case of a somewhat more
complex configuration that incorporates the insight that language use comprises
more than one subject of conceptualization.8 Consider figure 3.4.
The ‘‘ground’’ of any linguistic usage event consists of two conceptualizers—
the ‘‘communicator’’ (conceptualizer 1 in figure 3.4), who takes responsibility for
the utterance, and the ‘‘addressee’’ (conceptualizer 2 in figure 3.4), with whom the
communicator enters into a coordination relation—and the knowledge that they
mutually share, including models of each other and of the discourse situation. On
this view, the ground is essentially ‘‘common ground’’ (see Clark 1996; also Sinha
1999 for further psychological and philosophical considerations motivating this
view of ‘‘ground’’ and Verhagen 2005 for linguistic considerations). The point of a
linguistic utterance is, generally speaking, that the first conceptualizer invites the
second to jointly attend to an object of conceptualization in some specific way and
to update the common ground by doing so; that is, both conceptualizers are in-
volved in coordinating cognition by means of language, with one conceptualizer
taking the initiative in each specific instance. This coordination relationship be-
tween the two conceptualizers is indicated by the lower horizontal line in figure 3.4,
and the relation of joint attention between the conceptualizers and the object of
conceptualization by the vertical line.
Figure 3.4 represents a conceptual space which can be organized in different
ways and which is reflected in different linguistic expressions. Extreme cases at one
end are those in which the meaning of the expression does not in any respect
involve an element of the ground and which may thus be labeled maximally
‘‘objective.’’ Schematically, the first type of situation may be represented as in
figure 3.5.
Figure 3.4. The construal configuration and its basic elements
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The use of dotted lines in figure 3.5 indicates that, although the ground may be
said to figure in the interpretation of any utterance (in some ‘‘tenuous sense’’;
Langacker 1990b: 9), it is not signaled by the conventional meaning of ‘‘maximally
objective’’ linguistic units. That is to say, these linguistic units wholly pertain to the
level of the object of conceptualization, which is indicated by the use of bold lines:
they ‘‘profile’’ aspects of the object of conceptualization, but none at the level of the
subjects of conceptualization or of the relation between the two levels. Such ‘‘pure’’
cases are relatively rare, and artificial. One might think of ‘‘common nouns and
verbs considered in isolation (for example lamp, tree, . . .)’’ (Langacker 1990b: 9) or
a label like ‘‘bathroom’’ on a door (Theo Janssen, p.c.). Even a noun phrase such as
the horse or a simple tensed sentence (John owns a horse) are not purely objective in
this sense, as the identity of the referent or the time of the described event are
accessed via the communicative situation (which is why the article and the tense
marking are called ‘‘grounding predications’’). Note also that, even though in spe-
cific utterances, a single common or proper noun may be used to attract an inter-
locutor’s attention (Wolves!) or to invite him/her to respond in a particular way
(John?), this occurrence of cognitive coordination is not due to the meaning of the
nouns, so the ground is not said to be profiled by these elements.
The construal configuration, as represented in figure 3.4, may be used to indicate
differences between linguistic units in the same language, but also between seemingly
similar elements in different languages or at different historical stages of a language
(with one element conventionally marking only certain elements of the construal
configuration, and the other some other, or more, elements). This is the way this
representation will be used in the remainder of this chapter. The extreme case at the
other end involves the mirror image of the situations depicted in figure 3.5, that is,
expressions in which only elements of the ground and/or the relationship between
them are profiled, and no aspect of an object of conceptualization is marked lin-
guistically. This is represented in figure 3.6.
Examples of such purely subjective utterances are interjections, as in greetings
(Hi), apologies (Sorry), or calls for attention (Hey). Even more simple configurations
Figure 3.5. Construal configuration in maximally ‘‘objective’’ expressions
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may be possible in which only one element is really profiled, as in noninteractional
signs of disgust or frustration (Yuck, Damn). In actual usage, however, these sub-
jective utterances also involve aspects of language users’ experience that function as
objects of conceptualization (such as what triggered the apology or the bad taste of
some piece of food), but these objective elements are not indicated by the con-
ventional meanings of these elements, which only express a subjective reaction or
organize the relationship between speaker and addressee.
The fact that maximally objective and maximally subjective expressions con-
stitute only restricted kinds of language use demonstrates, in fact, that the normal
situation is for linguistic expressions to construe some specified features of an
object of conceptualization in relation to one or more facets of the ground. Labeling
objects and producing interjections constitute the opposite extremes on a con-
tinuum from maximally objective to maximally subjective expressions, and thus the
exceptions; expressions in the ‘‘middle part’’ of this continuum are the rule.
It will be recalled that many of the construal operations presented in sections 2
and 3 reflect cognitive abilities relating only to the object level of conceptualization.
Still, the fact that the classifications of construal operations were in agreement on
the importance of a class of perspectival construal phenomena suggests that the
structure of the basic construal configuration cannot be complete without a subject
level of conceptualization. Indeed, expressions evoking perspectival phenomena
make explicit reference to the subject level of this configuration, and/or its relation
to the object level, while other expressions of construal do not refer to the ground
(although, of course, the decision to use, or to refrain from using, any expression,
normally involves the ground as it is made by speakers on the basis of an assess-
ment of their interlocutors and the rest of the communicative situation). I have
furthermore suggested that the basic construal configuration should be seen as
involving a relation of intersubjective coordination, reflecting the typically human
cognitive ability to identify with conspecifics and thus to conceive of things from
other points of view. I will now develop the latter point further, showing that it not
only covers traditionally recognized perspectival construals, but may also extend to
other construals in a natural way.
Figure 3.6. Construal configuration in highly ‘‘subjective’’ expressions
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5. Perspectivization
.................................................................................................................................................
5.1. General Grounding
We have seen that a particular spatial configuration of two entities X and Y can be
encoded as X is below Y and as Y is above X, and therefore that the semantics of
these expressions necessarily involves an element of construal, in this case Figure/
Ground organization. Another dimension of construal is involved in similar uses
of these expressions, as exemplified in (3) and (4):
(3) The ballroom is below.
(4) Write to the address above for full details.
In each of these cases, the landmark with respect to which the trajector is located is
part of the ground of the utterance. The position of the ballroom in (3) is calcu-
lated from the common position of the speech participants or the position of the
addressee (for example, when (3) is uttered as an instruction over the telephone).
Likewise, if (4) is a sentence in a particular document currently relevant for the
speech participants (i.e., part of the common ground), then the location of the
address is calculated from the position of sentence (4) in this document. So, in each
of these cases, we have a situation, unlike the ones discussed so far, in which a
relation between the ground and the object of conceptualization actually is profiled
in the interpretation of the expressions. This is indicated in figure 3.7 by the bold
vertical line representing the construal relation.
Profiling a relationship with the ground is obviously not a necessary condition
for the use of such lexical items as below and above, but it is a necessary condition in
constructions where the landmark is not represented linguistically. In particular,
spatial expressions indicating the position of specific text portions relative to the
currently relevant one, as illustrated by (4) and similar sentences such as Fur-
ther instructions are below, may be considered a conventional pattern. Thus, it has
become a convention of English that the items below and above allow for such a
perspectivized construal, and it is this construal which distinguishes them from
other items such as beside, which does not participate in a construction of the type
X be beside to indicate a position to the side of some element of the ground. Note
also that there do not seem to be specific restrictions on the interpretation of an
entity’s location relative to the ground, as long as it is computable from the context
in which the utterance is interpreted.
Another example in English of an expression whose landmarkmay be construed
as an element of the ground is across, as is illustrated in (5) and (6).
(5) Vanessa is sitting across the table.
(6) Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica.
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In (5), the position with respect to which Vanessa is being located is an element of the
ground (the speaker), while it is an element of the object of conceptualization in (6).
Possibly, there is a difference in degree of conventionality between examples (3) and
(4) and examples (5) and (6): the usage of below and above in (3) and (4) represents a
special subtype of their ‘‘normal’’ use, whereas, in (5) and (6), it is the subjective
construal of across in (5) that can be considered prototypical, and the ‘‘objectified’’ use
in (6) a special subtype. For relative spatial indications such as to the left/right, con-
strual with respect to the ground is always possible, even when an explicit reference
point is mentioned. In (7), Vanessa may obviously be sitting at Veronica’s right-hand
side, but the relative order of Veronica and Vanessa may also be ‘‘left-to-right’’ from a
conceptualizer’s point of view (even though Vanessa might be at Veronica’s left-hand
side from Veronica’s point of view, e.g., when they are facing the conceptualizer).
(7) Vanessa is sitting to the right of Veronica.
From the foregoing examples, it appears, then, that there are differences in the
degree of conventionality with which a construal configuration such as in figure 3.7
may be associated with a specific linguistic form. There are also linguistic items
that always comprise a construal with respect to the ground as part of their semantic
characterization. The referent of yesterday, for example, can never be determined
without using knowledge about the time of the ground. With linguistic items of
this kind, we enter the realm of what is traditionally called ‘‘deictic’’ elements (see
Brisard 2002, for explorations of deixis from a cognitive point of view). When
viewing deixis as a type of construal, however, one no longer restricts it to some-
thing limited to and determined by a specific class of linguistic items (so-called
‘‘deictic’’ morphemes). As we have seen, construal with respect to an element of the
ground is something that can be associated with different elements to different
degrees of conventionality. Of course, one may want to identify the class of elements
in a language whose meanings necessarily invoke elements of the ground as deictic,
but that should not imply that deixis does not occur elsewhere.
Other examples of elements whose meaning requires calculation with respect
to some element of the ground, that is, as deictic in a broad sense, are the verbs come
and go and the simple past tense (in English and several other languages). A particular
situation can be described both as Santa Claus came in and as Santa Claus went in;
Figure 3.7. Construal configuration in (minimally) ‘‘perspectivized’’ expressions
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the different lexicalizations reflect different construals with respect to a ‘‘point of
view’’ identifiable for the conceptualizers (come involves a point of view inside the
space entered by Santa Claus; went a point of view outside that space). The choice of
this point of view is not further constrained; it may be the speaker’s or the hearer’s, but
also that of some participant whose point of view has been introduced explicitly into
the discourse (see below, at the end of section 6.2). Slightly differently, the past tense
locates an event outside the ground, thus outside the scope of the immediate expe-
riences of the conceptualizers in the ground, without differentiating between them
(see Boogaart and Janssen, this volume, chapter 31, for further discussion).
5.2. Specific Grounding
In addition to the deictic elements indicating a general type of grounding, there are
other deictic elements that indicate a different, more specific kind of construal.
Consider figure 3.8.
This configuration characterizes instances of what may be called first-person
deixis and is present in expressions such as here, now, and this/these. For example,
while the expression yesterday does invoke the ground, it does not profile a temporal
point of the ground, and it does not invoke a specific conceptualizer as distinct
from another. The expression now, on the other hand, does profile a time over-
lapping with that of the ground (i.e., the time envisaged by conceptualizer 1 as the
time of communication—not necessarily the moment at which the utterance is
physically produced).
Counterparts of first-person deixis expressions are there, then, and that/those. The
latter are usually characterized as ‘‘distal,’’ while the former are called ‘‘proximate.’’
The terms ‘‘proximate’’ and ‘‘distal’’ suggest that these sets of expressions express
different distances between the conceptualizer and the object of conceptualization.
However, as Janssen (2002, 2004) has argued, the terms actually have more to do with
the construal relationship between conceptualizer and object of conceptualization
than with the distance between them. For instance, when a physician investigating a
sore spot on a patient utters Is this where it hurts? and the patient responds with Yes,
that is where it hurts, the difference between this and that, and especially the patient’s
Figure 3.8. ‘‘First-person deixis’’ construal configuration
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use of that, cannot be adequately characterized in terms of (non)proximity, since the
spot referred to is on the patient’s body. Rather, what the patient does is to indicate
that the spot referred to is not as much in his/her focus of attention as it is in somebody
else’s, in this case, the physician’s (Janssen 2002: 172–73). In this respect, Janssen
quotes a suggestion from C. Lyons to the effect that the difference between this and
that can be related to the category of person; indeed, in the situation described, a
proper paraphrase of the meaning of that would be ‘the spot you are focusing on’, so
that it would involve a construal configuration as indicated in figure 3.9.
However, although figure 3.9 represents the natural construal configuration for
expressions such as that, there, and then in many contexts, it is not applicable to all
of their uses. In other contexts these expressions can also profile entities, moments,
and locations which have neither the speaker’s nor the addressee’s immediate at-
tention. Thus, the general rule here is that linguistic items expressing this construal
are defined negatively with respect to the ground, specifically conceptualizer 1.
Similarly, so-called third-person personal pronouns (he, she, they, and their
oblique and possessive counterparts) are defined negatively with respect to the ground
and specifically with respect to both conceptualizers 1 and 2. Still, the identification of
their referents has to take place via the ground; they are still objects of shared attention
(as first and second persons are by participating in the communicative situation), ei-
ther established ostensively or as prominent discourse referents (see van Hoek 2003).9
6. Coordination of Perspectives
.................................................................................................................................................
6.1. Implicit Multiple Perspectives
I have characterized the horizontal line between the conceptualizers in the basic
construal configuration of figure 3.4 as representing a process of coordinating cog-
nition. This coordination relation does not play a role in the perspectivized con-
struals discussed so far, but it is crucial in an important class of linguistic
Figure 3.9. ‘‘Second-person deixis’’ construal configuration
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expressions, namely, sentential negation and related expressions. Consider, for in-
stance, (8) and (9), each of which is a possible description of a person feeling sad.
(8) Mary is not happy.
(9) Mary is unhappy.
Both expressions may be said to invoke the notion of happiness serving as the
Ground for the characterization of Mary’s actual state of mind (the Figure). In this
dimension of construal, (8) and (9) do not differ, so the difference must involve yet
another type of construal. The relevant dimension here is defined by the specific
human ability to entertain other points of view in the same way as one’s own,
which we explicitly incorporated into the construal configuration by distinguishing
two subjects of conceptualization (the bottom part of figure 3.4). In particular, it is
the coordination relation between the conceptualizers that appears to be crucially
involved in distinguishing (8) from (9). It is only sentence (8) that profiles two
distinct views with respect to the proposition Mary is happy (or two ‘‘mental
spaces’’ in the sense of Fauconnier 1985; see also Fauconnier, this volume, chapter
14), that is, only (8) involves two conceptualizers with an opposite epistemic stance
toward this proposition (conceptualizer 1 rejects the positive epistemic stance of
conceptualizer 2).10 This can observed from the behavior of the phrase on the
contrary (Verhagen 2005: 31–32):
(10) Mary is not happy. On the contrary, she is feeling really depressed.
(11) #Mary is unhappy. On the contrary, she is feeling really depressed.
The use of the negation not in (10) evokes a second mental space: it profiles the
contrast between the stance toward ‘Mary being happy’ in some other mental space
and the speaker’s (the so-called ‘‘base’’ space of conceptualizer 1). It is this evoked
second mental space to which the discourse marker on the contrary can relate:
Mary’s being depressed is contrary to the idea of her being happy, not to her not
being happy (which is what conceptualizer 1 has just asserted). Morphological
negation with un- lacks this power to evoke a second mental space contrasting with
the base space, and this is what makes (11) incoherent. Sentential negation thus
yields a typical and quite general case of the construal configuration depicted in
figure 3.10.
What the negative morpheme not itself profiles is just the relation between the
perspectives of the two conceptualizers, namely, a relationship of opposition, such
that the view of the conceptualizer 2 should be replaced by that of conceptualizer 1.
However, it is part of the conventional use of not that an object of conceptuali-
zation has to be specified (so that it may actually more adequately be regarded as a
construction, unlike the negative element No, which precisely cannot be applied to
linguistic material profiling an object of conceptualization). This is why the con-
strual configuration for sentential negation is represented as in figure 3.10 rather
than as in figure 3.6. Furthermore, other construal phenomena may be operative
with respect to the object of conceptualization as represented in the utterance,
determining, for example, Figure/Ground-alignments, temporal deixis, and so on.
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So while any linguistic usage event involves two conceptualizers as part of its
ground, sentential negation (as well as a phrase such as on the contrary in English)
actually profiles two viewpoints being brought into coordination in the linguistic
material. In the language of adult speakers, and in particular in fairly complex
discourse, the point of view being rejected does not have to be the actual ad-
dressee’s, and not even a specific person’s, but even when it is not precisely ‘‘an-
chored’’ in the actual communicative situation, it remains a profiled mental space
in which a different epistemic stance toward the proposition is entertained than in
the space of conceptualizer 1. Another type of construction to which the same
general characterization applies is that of concessive connectives (see Verhagen
2000; 2005: chapter 4).
Viewing sentential negation as a case of construal—profiling the coordination
relation between two epistemically distinct conceptualizers with respect to the same
object of conceptualization—has the advantage of allowing for a natural extension
to other elements that behave conceptually and linguistically like negation, even
though they may differ from negation in terms of truth conditions. For example,
the expressions few linguists and a few linguists may refer to sets of exactly the same
size (whether absolute or relative), but only the former construes the relation-
ship between the two conceptualizers with respect to the object of conceptuali-
zation as one of opposition. It exhibits the grammatical behavior of negation
(witness contrasts in the context of polarity items, e.g., any: Few linguists have any
idea about evolutionary theory vs. *A few linguists have any idea about evolutionary
theory). The same holds for its discourse behavior, witness the naturalness of the
exchange in A–B in (12) in contrast with the exchange in (13), in which A–B is not
natural, but A–B’ is.
(12) A: Few linguists still believe in transformations.
B: So you think they won’t be around much longer?
B': #So you think they’ll still be around for some time?
(13) A: A few linguists still believe in transformations.
B: #So you think they won’t be around much longer?
B': So you think they’ll still be around for some time?
Figure 3.10. Construal configuration for coordination of perspectives
1____
0 ____
1____
33625_u03_UNCORR_PRF.3d_68_05-29-07
68 arie verhagen
This parallelism between grammatical and discourse properties clearly demon-
strates that what is profiled by sentential negation, as well as other ‘‘negative’’
elements, is a relation of epistemic opposition between two conceptualizers,
conceptualizer 1 rejecting the cognitive state of conceptualizer 2 in the process of
representing it (for further elaboration and discussion, see Verhagen 2005: chapter
2). It should be noted, though, that this brief discussion can hardly scratch the
surface of the complexities involved in negation and polarity, especially in relation
to the scalar inferences invited by many expressions in natural languages (see Israel
1998, and especially various studies by Horn, of which Horn 1996 is illustrative).
Yet another subtype of expressions that instantiate this type of construal are
modal verbs and adverbs, as exemplified in (14) and (15).
(14) Some theoreticians may deny the relevance of these results.
(15) Frankly, some theoreticians deny the relevance of these results.
In a sentence like Someone with such a track record may say things like this, the
modal auxiliary may designates a relationship of permission in the object of con-
ceptualization (‘being allowed’, the so-called deontic reading).11 But the natural in-
terpretation of may in (14) is that it designates a relationship in the ground; it evokes
the views that some theoreticians deny the relevance of the results and that some do
not, and profiles conceptualizer 1 as the ground element endorsing that the former
possibility is the one to be reckoned with. It appears, then, that epistemic construal
shares properties with sentential negation in profiling parts of the ground but differs
from sentential negation in that, besides evoking two conceptualizers with distinct
epistemic stances, it also makes a definite claim about the object of conceptualiza-
tion. Although epistemic may, as in (14), operates on an object of conceptualization,
it does not, in this sense, designate an element of the object of conceptualization, but
only of the ground; its construal is of the type depicted in figure 3.11.12
Similarly, the adverb frankly in (15) does not designate the presence of frank-
ness in one of the participants in the conceptualized event. Rather, it profiles both
the present speaker’s frankness in saying this, as well as an attempt to acknowledge
the fact that the addressee may not like the implications.13 The reading in which
frankly profiles an aspect of the object of conceptualization rather than the ground
Figure 3.11. Construal configuration for epistemic interpretation
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is more natural with another word order and intonation contour (Some theoreti-
cians frankly deny the relevance of these results). The fact that in front position
frankly takes elements of the ground (the utterance itself and how it may be taken
by the addressee) as its base and not the object of conceptualization implies that
the construal relation itself is in this case even less profiled than in the case of
epistemic may, so that this frankly-sentence exemplifies the highly subjective con-
strual configuration of figure 3.6 rather than that of figure 3.11. Yet, the highly
subjective nature of a construal is certainly a matter of degree, as the use of frankly
still imposes a constraint on the nature of the object of conceptualization: it must
be some piece of discourse.
Some elements in a language may allow objective as well as epistemic, and
‘‘speech act’’ construals. This has been proposed, for example, for some causal
connectives (e.g., because in English) by Sweetser (1990). Consider the following
examples.
(16) John typed her thesis because he really loves her.
(17) John really loves her, because he typed her thesis.
(18) What are you doing tonight? Because there’s a good movie on.
In (16), because profiles a causal relationship as part of the object of conceptuali-
zation; in (17), it construes an element of the object of conceptualization (the fact
that John typed her thesis) as an argument for the addressee to accept the con-
clusion that John’s love for her must also be part of the object of conceptualization
(an epistemic construal of the type depicted in figure 3.11); and in (18), it justifies an
element of the ground itself, namely, the speech act of asking.
What we have seen, then, is that these are all linguistic expressions—just like the
spatial markers below and across—that as such allow both relatively objective and
relatively subjective construals. The actual type of construal varies depending on sev-
eral contextual features (for an illuminating discussion of such factors in the case of
modals, see Heine 1995). Whether there are constraints on the types of construal
allowed for specific linguistic items is a matter of (historically developed) convention.
As Sweetser noted, there are languages in which an objective or an epistemic con-
strual of a causal relationship requires distinct causal connectives; the fact that because
can be used in these different, historically developed ways, is thus a convention of
modern English. We will briefly return to this issue in section 7, on subjectification.
6.2. Explicit Multiple Perspectives
The use of modal auxiliaries and adverbs as in (14) and (15) is sometimes called
‘‘speaker-oriented’’ and paraphrased by means of complement constructions with a
first-person subject in the matrix clause (e.g., I consider it possible that . . . , I frankly
say to you that . . . ). This raises the issue what aspects of the construal configuration
are profiled by such complement constructions themselves. Until fairly recently, it
was usually (explicitly or implicitly) assumed that complement clauses are subor-
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dinate structures, occupying an argument position of the predicate in the ‘‘main’’
clause and are thus subordinate (e.g., Jespersen 1933; Noonan 1985, among many
others). In cognitive linguistic work, this view has also been the starting point of a
number of analyses; for example, Langacker (1991: 436) states: ‘‘Complement clauses
are prototypical instances of subordination; . . . I know she left designates the pro-
cess of knowing, not of leaving.’’ As the example demonstrates, such a view suggests
that the main clause of a complement construction (also when it involves an ele-
ment of the ground) describes an event in the same way as a simple clause does, that
is, as an object of conceptualization. Recent research, however, suggests that in many
important cases this is actually a misconception. Studying child language acqui-
sition, Diessel and Tomasello (2001) have shown that, apparently, children’s first
complement constructions contain ‘‘complement-taking predicates’’ of the type I
think and you know, which function ‘‘as an epistemic marker, attention getter, or
marker of illocutionary force,’’ and that the whole complex utterance ‘‘contains
only a single proposition expressed by the apparent complement clause’’ (97). Thus,
the complement-taking predicates do not contribute to profiling an object of con-
ceptualization; rather, they instantiate the construal configuration of figure 3.11,
only profiling (parts of) the ground. It is only at later stages that children start
saying things like I thought and She knows, in which someone’s thinking or knowing
may be construed as an object of conceptualization (see figures 3.5 and 3.7) and the
complement-taking predications as ‘‘main clauses’’ to which the ‘‘complement’’ is
‘‘subordinated.’’14 Once this ability has developed, it also becomes possible for a
conceptualizer, in uttering I think, to construe his own thinking as an object of
conceptualization for specific purposes, as in I think he will arrive on time, but I am
not sure/but John is skeptical (especially with I or think stressed in the first conjunct).
While the use of I think as an epistemic marker constitutes an instance of figure 3.11,
its construal as an object of conceptualization is a special case of figure 3.8. It is a
case of first-person deixis (belonging to the same family as now, here, and this), but
with conceptualizer 1 as an element of the object of conceptualization in the con-
strual configuration. It may thus be called an instance of ‘‘objectification,’’15
whereby the primary subject of conceptualization is construed as part of its own
object of conceptualization; see figure 3.8'.
Figure 3.8'. Construal configuration with ‘‘first person’’ as object of conceptualization
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However, such a ‘‘detached’’ view of one’s own cognitive state cannot be
considered a very normal use for these constructions. In fact, the analysis by Diessel
and Tomasello entails that even after the development of the ability to construe the
content of a complement-taking predicate as a possible object of conceptualization,
phrases such as I think, I/You see simply continue to be used as markers of epistemic
stance, attention-getting, or illocutionary force. This is strongly corroborated, at
least for conversational interaction, in a study by Thompson (2002), showing that
participants in conversation organize important aspects of their interaction, and of
their (common) personal relationships with the things being talked about, by means
of such complement-taking predicates, and that this organizational role in fact
exhausts the function of these fragments of discourse. The analysis by Thompson
actually provides the basis for an explanation of the correlation noted by Diessel and
Tomasello (2001: 136) between the first complement-taking predicates in children’s
utterances and their frequency in the ambient language produced by their parents
and caretakers.
Such results, then, show that not only lexical items but also grammatical
constructions—including complementation constructions, which are generally con-
sidered a core part of syntax—may exhibit variation that can be captured in terms
of the general construal configuration, with a crucial role for its subjective part, the
ground. This conclusion need not really be surprising for a framework recognizing
a continuum between lexicon and grammar and adopting an essentially cognitive
view of linguistic semantics, but it still had to be demonstrated.
One specific use of these grammatical constructions is that they may assign an
object of conceptualization to a conceptualizer in a particular way. While sentential
negation and modal verbs and adverbs implicitly evoke another mental space be-
sides that of conceptualizer 1, complement constructions may to some extent put
another mental space ‘‘on stage’’ (but cf. note 13).16 When they do, they provide the
conceptualization of the ground entering into a construal relationship with the
content of the subordinated clause; in that case, these complement constructions
are not directly interpreted as construed by the actual producer of the discourse, but
by the represented subject of conceptualization. Consider a simple case such as (19).
(19) The president is afraid that he might not be re-elected.
The actual speaker of (19) may have a certain knowledge about the president’s re-
election (for example, when the speaker is in charge of the election process and has
just completed the count of the votes). The use of might relates to the epistemic
stance of the president. The alternative mental space evoked by might—and the
same would go for the negation not—are construed with respect to the latter stance
and not the epistemic stance of the actual producer of the utterance.
Note that different elements behave differently in such constructions. For
example, the first-person pronoun in a complement clause always designates the
person responsible for the whole utterance (The president was afraid that I might
fail), while the ‘‘proximate’’ demonstrative this is ambiguous. (In The president was
afraid that he might fail at this point, this either refers to the point that is in ‘his’
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focal attention or that is in ‘mine’—the former reading in effect boils down to
construing a ‘‘free indirect speech’’ representation.) Shifting of the deictic center
occurs not only in the context of complement constructions, although this con-
stitutes the prime grammaticalized instrument for a deictic shift. In principle, any
explicit introduction of another person’s state of mind in a discourse may produce
such a shift, as illustrated by (20).
(20) I looked through the window and saw that the children were very ner-
vous. In few minutes, Santa Claus would come in.
The question what constitutes the ground with respect to the elements few and
come should be directly construed, and how this relates to the ground of the pro-
ducer of the entire discourse may involve considerable complexities (see Sanders
1994). But whatever the details, the very fact that such differential construals are
generally possible is a major motivation for characterizing the construal configu-
ration in terms of the slightly abstract roles of ‘‘conceptualizers’’ (e.g., conceptu-
alizers 1 and 2, with the first being interpreted as taking the initiative), rather than in
terms of the concrete roles of actual speaker and hearer (see Talmy 2000b: 337). The
actual speaker of (20) does not have to be taken as expressing any personal un-
certainty or anxiety concerning Santa Claus’s arrival (imagine that I refers to the
person playing the role of Santa Claus), but few still evokes the subjective stance
and come the deictic origin of the conceptualizer responsible for the thought of
Santa’s entering, that is, the children.
7. Subjectification
.................................................................................................................................................
So far we have used the different profiling patterns in the basic construal config-
uration of figure 3.4 as ways of capturing recurring features in the meaning and use
of several kinds of expressions. It has already been hinted at (in the beginning of
section 4 and in section 6.2) that relationships between different profiling patterns
can also be conceived of as the outcome of dynamic processes. In the course of
children’s language development, for example, complement-taking predicates start
out as purely epistemic markers and later acquire the potential of designating
an object of conceptualization. Such a process may appropriately be characterized
as one of objectification: initially, an expression does not profile any element of an
object of conceptualization, but in the end it does.
The reverse process is that of subjectification. In its pure form, subjectification
may involve an expression initially profiling no part of the ground or not profiling
the construal relationship and then acquiring the potential of profiling, in one or
more respects, the construal relationship and/or parts of the ground (a possible
example is the shift from marking perfectivity to marking past tense as discussed
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at the end of section 3). But it may also consist in an increase of the role of the
construal relation or the ground in the profile of an expression, or (what ultimately
may be part of the same process) a decrease of the role of the object of concep-
tualization.
The phenomenon of subjectification is a highly regular and characteristic fea-
ture of many processes of language change, as demonstrated in a considerable body
of work by Traugott (e.g., Traugott 1989, 1995, and especially the comprehen-
sive Traugott and Dasher 2002). Traugott defines subjectification as a pragmatic-
semantic process whereby ‘‘meanings become increasingly based in the speaker’s
subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition’’ (Traugott 1989: 35; 1995: 31).
Notice two features of this definition: subjectification refers to a historical process
producing a change, and it is semasiological, that is, it is concerned with linguistic
symbols (or assemblies of symbols) and with what they mean. Thus, the develop-
ment of Englishwill, from expressing a desire or intention on the part of the referent
of its grammatical subject to expressing a prediction by the speaker of the utterance,
is a clear case of subjectification under this definition.
It should be noted, in order to avoid confusion, that the term ‘‘subjectifica-
tion’’ is used here in a way that is different from, albeit related to, the one pro-
posed by Langacker (1990b: 17). For Langacker ‘‘subjectivity’’ and ‘‘subjectification’’
refer not to expressions, but primarily to the way an element of a conceptualiza-
tion is perspectively construed, namely, objectively or subjectively (cf. Langacker
1999: 150). For example, the difference between Vanessa is sitting across the table
from me and Vanessa is sitting across the table according to Langacker is that
the same content (the speaker as the landmark of the across-relation) is ‘‘objectively
construed’’ in the former because it is put on stage by the expression me (similarly
to another nominal expression (see 5 above), whereas it is ‘‘subjectively construed’’
in the latter because it remains offstage as the implicit locus of conception (see (6)
above). Accordingly, Langacker uses the term ‘‘subjectification’’ to refer to an in-
crease in subjectivity in this sense, namely, the increased construal of some notion
as functioning implicitly in the ground rather than on stage, in the conceived
situation; subjectification is ‘‘the realignment of some relationship from the ob-
jective axis to the subjective axis’’ (Langacker 1990b: 17), where ‘‘subjective axis’’
refers to the construal relationship.
Although Langacker’s and Traugott’s notions of subjectification are related,
each is clearly useful in its own domain, the former primarily in the area of se-
mantic analysis, the latter in that of semantic change. There has been some dis-
cussion of the precise relation between Langacker’s and Traugott’s notions (see
several contributions in Stein and Wright 1995; Langacker 1999: 149–50; Traugott
and Dasher 2002: 97–98). Still, it seems that when restricted to phenomena of
semasiological change—which Langacker evidently wants to include under his ru-
bric of subjectification—at least the extensions of the two notions coincide: when-
ever a new meaning is more based in the speaker’s belief state/attitude than the old
one, some realignment from the objective to the subjective axis has apparently
taken place. In this section, I am concerned with a certain kind of shift in the
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meanings of linguistic items, which is why my use of the term here is basically the
same as its use in studies of semantic change.
Diachronic subjectification exhibits ‘‘unidirectionality’’: the meaning of a lin-
guistic expression (in a semasiological perspective) is much more likely to develop
from relatively objective to more subjective than the other way around. Thus, one
repeatedly finds a verb of desire and/or intention developing into a marker of future
(e.g., English will), but seldom a future marker developing into a verb denoting
intention. Temporal connectives regularly develop adversative meanings (e.g.,
English while, as in Mary likes oysters while Bill hates them), but adversative con-
nectives seldom, if ever, develop into temporal ones (see Bybee, this volume,
chapter 36). What is it that makes subjectification largely unidirectional? The an-
swer to that question must lie in the actual processes that produce the changes. For
several cases, Traugott has shown that the relevant cognitive and communicative
mechanisms involve inferences that are first ‘‘only’’ pragmatic, that is, related to
specific instances of use in a particular context, and then become associated with
the linguistic expression as such, in other words, ‘‘conventionalized.’’ For example,
when the actual relevance of mentioning the co-temporality of two events by means
of while lies in its unexpectedness and hearers/readers assume that it is this unex-
pectedness that the speaker/writer intended, the association between while and
unexpectedness may be reinforced to the extent that it becomes conventionalized
(i.e., the marker of co-temporality can be used to mark unexpectedness without the
hearer having to compute the answer to the question ‘Why is the speaker marking
co-temporality here?’), even to the extent that co-temporality may become unnec-
essary. The process of the conventionalization of pragmatic inferences explains
unidirectionality in that even if the original conventional meaning of an expression
at some point in time does not profile a feature of the ground, the communicative
acts in which it is used will always comprise participants making inferences—
hearers constructing interpretations of what the speakers intended and speakers
anticipating those interpretations—so that there are always (more) subjective ele-
ments in actual interpretations that may end up getting conventionalized.
The general unidirectionality of subjectification points to a fundamental asym-
metry in the construal configuration. The actual use of any linguistic utterance al-
ways entails that one conceptualizer is trying to influence another one’s cognition
in a particular way by means of that specific utterance so that some (further)
inferences from the object of conceptualization to the ground are always relevant.17
But knowing what kind of coordination relationship is at stake in a specific com-
municative event does not as such license inferences concerning the object of con-
ceptualization. Any expression, even if it does not profile the construal relationship
or the ground, evokes the basic construal relation of figure 3.4 in a particular way
when it is actually used, and the recurrence of such features may gain prominence
and become conventional. In this essentially usage-based perspective, all linguistic
utterances display subjectivity of some sort, and subjectification may consist in the
gradual diminishing of the ‘‘weight’’ of objective features of conventional meaning
in favor of subjective ones. For example, consider the difference between (21) and
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(22), containing instances of the objective and of the subjectified (epistemic) use of
the speech act verb promise, respectively.
(21) John promised to be back in time.
(22) The debate promised to be interesting.
It is not the case that only (22) conveys a positive anticipation by the speaker. This
is just as much true for (21); witness the kind of inferences (21) licenses with respect
to the ground: it counts as a positive answer to the question ‘Do you think that
John will be back in time?’, and it would not be felicitous in a context in which the
person asking that question obviously does not desire John’s timely return. Fur-
thermore, there are also in-between cases such as (23) and (24).
(23) The newspaper promised to publish the results.
(24) The new strategy promised to produce interesting results.
These examples differ from each other and from (21) and (22), not so much in the
dimension ‘‘subjective, positive anticipation’’ (which they all share), but in the
degree to which a promise is considered to be (also) a part of the object of con-
ceptualization. It is easier for the newspaper in (23) than for the strategy in (24) to
be construed as metonymically or metaphorically related to human beings who are
conceptualized as committing themselves to something, and this is totally impos-
sible for the debate in (22). Thus, it actually seems better to characterize the cline
from (21), via (23) and (24), to (22) in terms of decreasing objectivity than in terms
of increasing subjectivity (see Langacker 1999 and Verhagen 1995 for further dis-
cussion, including syntactic correlates of the semantic differences).18 In any case,
the differences and changes can all be construed as ‘‘shifts’’ in the degree of pro-
filing of elements and relations in the basic construal configuration.
At the same time, this analysis once more demonstrates that it is crucial to
distinguish between the conventional forms of construal made available by the
resources of a language, and the construal conveyed in a particular instance of use.
In the domain of perspectivization discussed in this section, the phenomenon of
semantic change precisely consists in usage becoming conventionalized, which
therefore presupposes the distinction.
8. Conclusion
.................................................................................................................................................
Construal operations are central to language and cognition. They involve cognitive
abilities of humans with clear linguistic reflexes, but there seems to be no way to
organize them all in terms of an exhaustive classification system. Although the
basic construal configuration presented in this chapter is not a comprehensive
classification system, it incorporates the typically human ability to identify deeply
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with conspecifics and provides a unifying conceptual framework in terms of which
many semantic phenomena involving different kinds of ‘‘perspective’’ and ‘‘sub-
jectivity’’ can be captured. The dimensions and elements of the configuration may
be considered general and universal, but the actual distinctions drawn in this con-
ceptual space differ from one language to another and are variable over time, in
individual development as well as historically (in communities). The general uni-
directionality of historical processes of subjectification can be taken as indicative of
the basic asymmetry between subject and object of conceptualization.
NOTES
.................................................................................................................................................
I wish to thank the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) for providing me
with the opportunity, as a Fellow-in-residence, to write this chapter. I would also like to
thank Peter Harder, Theo Janssen, Ronald Langacker, and Mirna Pit, as well as the edi-
tors of this volume, for useful comments on the first draft of this chapter. Any remain-
ing errors and misconceptions are entirely my own responsibility.
1. In his 1993 paper, Langacker arranged (‘‘[if] only for expository purposes,’’ 448)
construal into the following five general dimensions: specificity, scope, prominence,
background, and perspective.
2. It has been suggested (Croft and Cruse 2004: chapter 3) that in his recent work,
Talmy dropped Force Dynamics as a separate construal category. Still, although Force
Dynamics it is not treated separately in chapter 1 of Talmy (2000a), it is clear from the
structure of the book that Talmy intended to maintain it (see also Talmy 2000a: 41).
3. While Talmy proposes Domain as a schematic category perpendicular to his four
types of ‘‘schematic systems,’’ Croft and Cruse (2004: chapter 3) rather suggest that Do-
main is an additional system. Talmy (2000a: 47) mentions one additional member of the
category Domain, namely, ‘‘identificational space,’’ to accommodate such differences as
those between you and they in their indefinite uses (the former indicating identification
with the speaker, the second nonidentification).
4. The object of conceptualization is represented as having at least some complexity
(there are two elements, connected in one way or another) precisely because of the
structural construal normally imposed on it.
5. Langacker’s term ‘‘ground’’ is not to be confused with the term ‘‘Ground’’ in
‘‘Figure/Ground alignment.’’
6. In later work in Cognitive Grammar (e.g., Langacker 1999, van Hoek 2003), one
does sometimes find representations in which the roles of S(peaker) and H(earer) are
distinguished.
7. For a more recent, and more subtle view, see Tomasello, Call, and Hare (2003a,
2003b).
8. In practice, many instances of construal configurations in the literature exhibit this
structure, as in Langacker (1990b) and van Hoek (2003).
9. Van Hoek (1997) provides a cognitive account of the way third-person pronouns
find their antecedents in sentences and in discourse, partly drawing on the inherent link
between first-person and third-person pronouns as markers of ‘‘other first persons.’’
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10. A possible semantic difference is also that (8) need not entail (9), while the
reverse entailment holds, so that (9) is, strictly speaking, more informative than (8).
However, in actual usage, one seldom, if ever, uses (8) to convey that Mary’s position
on the scale of happiness is right in the middle. This actually leads to an interesting ob-
servational question: Why do language users so often choose an apparently less infor-
mative question when a more informative one is readily available? The answer is given
in the analysis in the text (a detailed discussion can be found in Verhagen 2005: 32–35,
70–75).
11. With some interpretive effort, it is also possible to impose a deontic interpreta-
tion on (14), e.g., when some theoreticians is understood as referring to a group that has a
special status for one reason or another, which justifies their being allowed certain kinds
of behavior.
12. Langacker (1990b: 14) characterizes modals, also in their epistemic senses, as
profiling the object of conceptualization (schematically). He mentions in this connection
that modals may function as clausal pro-forms (She may, You must). However, this pos-
sibility is specific for English and may possibly be ascribed to the existence in the grammar
of English of the general pattern SubjectþAuxiliary (with the function of indicating a
clausal pro-form), so that the function of the epistemic modal itself may still be said to
involve only the construal relationship and the ground itself.
13. As such, it represents a case of what Traugott calls ‘‘intersubjectification,’’ i.e., the
development of a meaning which not (only) profiles a speaker’s subjective attitude toward
a proposition, but also his/her assessment of his/her relationship with the addressee in the
production of the utterance. Other instances of intersubjectification are tu/vous-type
distinctions in second-person address forms and honorifics (cf. Traugott and Dasher
2002).
14. In fact, I argue in Verhagen (2001, 2005) that it is normal for all complements, also
in written texts, to contain the information which an utterance actually contributes to a
discourse, even if the main clause may be read as independently designating an event (of
communication, cognition, or the like) distinct from the ground. For instance, these main
clauses rarely participate in the coherence relations of the discourse (unlike the comple-
ments); rather, they serve to specify in what way the information of the complement relates
to the perspective of conceptualizers 1 and/or 2 (as someone else’s, as something hoped for,
as a possibility, etc.). Further consequences, especially for the grammatical properties of the
constructions, are discussed in Verhagen (2005: chapter 3).
15. The content of this concept as I use it here is similar, if not identical, to that of
Langacker’s (1987). As I see it, the difference is that Langacker indiscriminatingly con-
siders all uses of the pronoun I as instantiating the configuration of figure 3.8'—in which
conceptualizer 1 ‘‘is also the primary object of conceptualization’’ (131), while I consider
many normal uses of the pronoun in such patterns as I think as well as in performative
utterances as indicating only conceptualizer 1, without turning him/her into an object
of conceptualization.
16. Another type of construction with a similar function is conditionals; see Dancygier
and Sweetser (1997) and especially Dancygier and Sweetser (2005).
17. For a discussion of the theory of communication underlying this view, see Ver-
hagen (2005: chapter 1).
18. It remains true, of course, that to the degree that objective conceptualization fades
as part of the meaning of an expression, the relative weight of subjectivity automatically
increases.1____
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